November 27, 2024*
SSRGA recently succeeded in obtaining reversal on appeal of a trial court’s ruling that ordered the former wife in a divorce proceeding to be responsible for the full amount of a loan she obtained to repay debt incurred for pregnancy-related expenses during the marriage.
The former wife had incurred significant credit card debt while she was pregnant and unable to work because she was required to be on bedrest for a long period of time. The former wife, who was then without health insurance, used credit cards to pay for her medical expenses and for the living expenses of the parties. She also borrowed a small amount of money from a friend. The former wife later obtained a $20,000 loan approximately four months prior to filing for divorce. She used those loan funds to consolidate the credit card debt and to repay the small loan from her friend.
At trial, the former husband argued that the former wife should be responsible for the full amount of the $20,000 loan. He pointed out that the former wife obtained the loan solely in her name, and that the loan was obtained only four months prior to the filing of the divorce petition. The former husband claimed he had not known anything about the $20,000 loan, although the former wife testified that he did. The former husband claimed that he did not know how the expenses of the pregnancy were paid, but he admitted that he did not pay them.
The trial court entered a final judgment that allocated the entire $20,000 loan to the former wife alone in equitable distribution. The trial court cited various sections of the equitable distribution statute that allow a court to unequally distribute an asset or liability in a dissolution of marriage proceeding. The former wife appealed.
SSRGA represented the former wife on appeal to the Fourth District Court of Appeal. We argued that the $20,000 loan was a marital liability as it was incurred during the parties’ intact marriage. We further maintained that the trial court had erroneously shifted the burden to the former wife to prove the loan should be equally distributed, rather than properly placing the burden on the former husband to prove that it should be unequally distributed. We stressed the lack of any evidence that the former wife had used the $20,000 for anything other than repaying the debts incurred for medical and living expenses during the time she was unable to work during her pregnancy.
The appeals court agreed with SSRGA’s arguments and issued a written opinion concluding the trial court erred by assigning the former wife the full amount of the loan in the equitable distribution. The appeals court found that the facts and statutory grounds cited by the trial court were insufficient to justify assigning the total amount of the loan to the former wife. The appeals court agreed that the former husband bore the burden on the issue. The appeals court pointed out that, although one statutory basis the trial court cited allows a court to consider intentional dissipation of marital assets under certain circumstances, the former husband had failed to present any evidence that the former wife had intentionally dissipated the loan funds. The appeals court concluded that none of the reasons cited by the trial court supported a departure from equitable division of the loan to assign it entirely to the former wife.
The appeals court reversed the final judgment as to the equitable distribution and remanded the case for the trial court to divide the loan equally between the parties. The appeals court also granted the former wife’s request for appellate attorney’s fees conditioned upon the trial court determining that she should be awarded fees under section 61.16, Florida Statutes. That statute allows a trial court to award a party to a dissolution of marriage attorney’s fees based on a party’s need and the other party’s ability to pay.
This favorable result for our client entitles her to a new equitable distribution that fairly distributes the $20,000 debt as a marital liability. It also allows her to seek her attorney’s fees for the appeal.
* Opinion not final until disposition of timely filed motion for rehearing *